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The Fuel Multiplier in Multi-Stage Supply Chains 
Abstract 
Fuel requirements on the battlefield impose direct costs associated with the resources 
necessary to transport the fuel and protect logistics assets, in addition to indirect energy 
security costs. Estimating the enterprise-wide demand for fuel associated with fuel 
consumption on the battlefield is a challenging, but necessary, step to making good 
decisions. This paper presents a modeling framework for estimating the enterprise-wide 
fuel requirements associated with a multistage fuel supply chain, demonstrating a 
multiplicative increase in fuel demand with additional stages, and examining the fuel 
impact of protecting the supply chain. 
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1. The Impact of Battlefield Fuel Demand 
In the last five years, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has begun to pay great 
attention to its energy requirements and, in particular, its operational fuel requirements. 
The monetary cost of fuel to the DoD made up 2.5% of its total budget in fiscal year (FY) 
2011, or approximately $17 billion, and both the percentage and absolute cost have been 
increasing [1]. About 75% of DoD’s energy consumption is classified as operational (and 
25% is installation energy [2]).  
The demand for fuel on the battlefield requires logistics support to deliver that fuel where 
and when it is needed, which imposes three major types of costs: resources, capability 
reductions, and additional vulnerability [3]: 
Resources: Logistics activities required to meet battlefield fuel demand are 
themselves resource-intensive, requiring transport and force-protection assets, 
personnel, and consumables. An Army study found that only 2 of the top 10 fuel-
consuming platforms are combat platforms [4]. 4 transport trucks and 2 cargo 
helicopters appear in the top 10, while the only combat platforms are the Abrams 
tank at number 5 and the Apache helicopter at number 10 [5].  
Capability Reductions: Logistics support, while highly capable, is not 
necessarily available in unlimited capacity at every time and place; therefore, fuel 
demand may reduce capabilities such as range and endurance. As the  
1st Marine Division Commander during the rapid 2003 invasion of Iraq, then-
Major General James Mattis,
1
 is widely quoted as saying, “Unleash us from the 
tether of fuel.” [1]. As General John Allen, who was the Commander of 
ISAF/USFOR-A (International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces in 
                                                        
1 General Mattis later served as Commander, U.S. Central Command. 
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Afghanistan), added in the following handwritten exhortation to a memo calling 
for greater energy efficiency: “Operational energy equates exactly to operational 
capability” (emphasis in the original). 
Vulnerability: Finally, the logistics network itself becomes a vulnerability. This 
was demonstrated clearly in July 2012 when a Taliban bomb destroyed 22 fuel 
tankers in the Samangan Province of Afghanistan. The tankers were transporting 
supplies to coalition forces [6]. In addition to the risk of the supply lines being cut 
off, the vulnerability of the supply chain exposes personnel to attack. The Army 
Environmental Policy Institute (AEPI) estimated that the United States incurred 
one casualty for every 24 fuel resupply convoys in Afghanistan [7]. Citing the 
Center for Army Lessons Learned, AEPI (2009) estimates that historically, about 
10%-12% of Army casualties may be attributed to resupply [7].  
Yet, battlefield fuel demand is increasing. Technological advances have increased the 
capability deployed with the warfighter. However, more advanced platforms and systems 
consume more fuel and electrical power. These increases have more than overwhelmed 
improvements such as more efficient engines and lighter materials. Total warfighter fuel 
demands have been steadily increasing for decades—a 175% increase since the Vietnam 
conflict [8]. 
A Defense Science Board (DSB) report (2008) highlighted the failure of DoD 
management processes to properly account for the enterprise-wide costs of fuel [3]. 
Before 2009, DoD analyses dramatically understated the total costs associated with fuel 
demand for new weapons systems and platforms. In cost analyses, fuel requirements were 
monetized at the Defense Logistics Agency-Energy (DLA-E, formerly Defense Energy 
Support Center) standard fuel price, regardless of where in the world the system was 
anticipated to be used, and whether DLA-E defense fuel supply points (DFSPs) could 
realistically be expected to provide fuel. The service-specific fuel logistics costs were 
neglected, therefore implicitly estimated at zero. 
In addition, estimates of performance and capability were almost certainly overstated in 
acquisition analyses, as war games and simulations implicitly assumed that the required 
supplies, including fuel, would be available with certainty. The DSB task force “was 
unable to identify any case where the logistics reductions or deployment and sustainment 
enhancements achievable from improvements in platform efficiency were quantitatively 
included as capability improvements and factored into trade-off decisions.” [3]. 
The fully burdened cost (FBC) of fuel (more recently generalized to energy) is the 
construct designed to fix this bias in the acquisition process. The DSB (2008) made five 
recommendations for changing management processes, the first of which was to base 
investment decisions on the “true cost of delivered fuel” [3]. This recommendation led to 
a mandate in the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act that defined the FBC of fuel 
(FBCF) as 
“the commodity price for fuel plus the total cost of all personnel and assets 
required to move and, when necessary, protect the fuel from the point at which the 
fuel is received from the commercial supplier to the point of use” 
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and called for the FBCF to be estimated and used in acquisition decisions [9]. 
The FBCF (now Fully Burdened Cost of Energy, FBCE) is the most influential analytic 
construct in operational energy. It is officially defined in terms of resources, and it has 
been interpreted as a measure in units of dollars. It is therefore a summary of the 
resources required to assure delivery of fuel to the platform or system requiring it. Since 
there are, however, two other more important types of costs associated with battlefield 
fuel demand—capability reductions and vulnerability—the FBCF has been interpreted to 
have a broader meaning. For example, Lovins (2010) argues that “FBCF is a wartime 
capability planning factor, not a peacetime cost estimate” [10]. While the FBCF (or FBC 
of energy) is correlated with capability reduction and vulnerability associated with the 
heavy logistics requirements of battlefield fuel demand, as defined, it is clearly the cost of 
resources consumed in the delivery of fuel. 
The FBC is currently required to be used in acquisition decisions. A framework for 
calculating the FBCE was developed by the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Operational Energy Plans and Programs (ASD (OEPP)) [2] and promulgated in 
Section 3.1.6 of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) [11] in July 2012. The 
guidance specifies that the FBCE will be estimated alongside the total ownership cost, 
but will be based on short combat scenarios. In other words, the FBCE should be 
calculated for a combat environment, rather than for peacetime use of the platform being 
evaluated. It specifies that in most planning scenarios, logistics will be organic (i.e., that 
DoD assets, rather than contractor assets, will be used). This implies that they may need 
to be fueled from within the supply chain. 
The DAG codifies but does not standardize the calculation of FBCF, and itemizes three 
price elements that must be included [11]:  
1. the fuel itself (used by the platform being analyzed);  
2. tactical delivery assets, to include Operations & Support (O&S), depreciation, and 
infrastructure costs of those assets; and  
3. security (which we call force protection). 
The guidance calls for price element #1, the fuel itself, to be priced at the DLA-E 
standard price. This assumption ignores differences in DLA costs for delivery to DFSPs, 
in different regions of the world, and, in general, will understate the costs for fuel at 
remote DFSPs outside the United States [12]. DLA-E provides contractor delivery of 
bulk fuels to DoD services at DFSPs. For contractor-provided delivery, it is relatively 
easy to estimate the FBCF, because contractors must build all their costs (with the 
exception of environmental externalities) into their rates in order to operate profitably. 
Contractor rates are, therefore, fully burdened with the cost of transport assets and any 
protection provided. Although it is straightforward [12] to estimate the FBCF delivered to 
DLA-E DFSPs, most FBC analyses do not do this. Instead, they use the DLA-E standard 
price as the cost of fuel at the DFSP. 
Estimating price elements 2 and 3 of the FBC of delivered fuel or other energy sources is 
not easy. Organizational and record-keeping systems are not always set up to separate 
assets (equipment, personnel, and supplies) involved in logistics from other assets; costs 
of unit-level logistics activities, for example, may not be easy to separate from costs for 
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other activities. Logistics assets used in delivering fuel are also used for other logistics 
activities. Even dedicated logistics units supply many types of items. Although fuel is 
generally the single largest demand item during sustainment, in extreme forward 
positions with few mechanized platforms, water demand may exceed fuel demand [13]. 
Apportioning costs among the different delivered items is one challenge. Some assets that 
are used in the logistics network are also used for non-logistics purposes, so determining 
what portion of their costs should be attributed to the logistics function is a further 
challenge. For example, mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs) and Apache 
helicopters, and the personnel that operate them, are used in convoy protection but are 
also used in other warfighting activities. Moreover, every asset has its own sustainment 
requirements (e.g., personnel require water, food, and other supplies in theater). 
The above estimation challenges tend to push analysts toward a focus on the easy-to-
measure costs, leading to an underestimate of the total resource cost of the logistics 
network required to deliver fuel. 
This paper addresses one further factor that leads to systematic underestimates in the 
FBCE. Estimates that include more than one stage in the supply chain conducted by 
service-owned assets leave out the cost of transporting and protecting fuel that is 
consumed by the downstream (later) stages in the network. These costs can be extremely 
large in long supply chains. Estimates that leave out the analysis of this fuel and its 
assured delivery costs systematically understate the enterprise-wide costs associated with 
battlefield fuel consumption. If underestimates are used in the acquisition process, the 
DoD risks continuing to rely on over-consuming weapons and platforms for decades into 
the future. 
2. Monetary and Nonmonetary Costs Associated With 
Enterprise-wide Fuel Requirements 
This paper focuses on enterprise-wide fuel requirements that are incurred by fuel 
consumption on the battlefield. Every gallon of fuel burned in a vehicle, aircraft, or 
generator in theater must be transported there, requiring fuel for transportation platforms 
(vehicles, aircraft, or vessels) and force-protection platforms. The enterprise-wide fuel 
requirement—the amount that must be purchased by the DoD—is therefore necessarily 
greater than the amount consumed on the battlefield. 
This paper introduces models that estimate the fuel multiplier—the total amount of fuel 
the DoD must procure per gallon delivered to the battlefield. The ratio is called the fuel 
multiplier, and multiplying it by the commodity price of fuel provides a lower bound on 
the FBCF. It leaves out all other costs, including procurement of logistics platforms and 
personnel costs. This paper does not quantify other costs associated with sustainment 
logistics, such as platform depreciation and maintenance, personnel, or deployment. 
As discussed earlier, the DLA-E’s costs to provide bulk fuels at remote DFSPs are higher 
than their costs to provide fuels inside the United States. In Afghanistan, for example, the 
U.S. DoD purchased contractor-delivered fuel for $6.39/gallon in Helmand Province in 
2009 [13]. 
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Market fuel prices are also far more volatile than prices for other items purchased by the 
DoD. Volatility is costly because it makes planning difficult. Recent price increases have 
forced the DLA-E to impose out-of-cycle increases in their standard price, after the 
services have budgeted at the lower rate. The DoD can ask Congress to increase the 
defense appropriation to cover the additional cost when fuel prices rise, but in the short 
term, rising fuel prices cause replanning and disruptions [14]. 
Finally, environmental and other costs associated with greenhouse gas emissions are 
incurred proportionally to the total amount of fuel purchased (and consumed) by the 
DoD, regardless of how it is used (e.g., powering generators, fuel trucks or combat 
vehicles). 
Underestimating the enterprise-wide fuel requirement associated with battlefield fuel 
consumption will underestimate all the above costs. This paper demonstrates that most 
FBCF analyses systematically underestimate the enterprise-wide fuel consumption 
associated with battlefield fuel consumption and, therefore, underestimate the incurred 
logistics costs and any additional costs related to the total amount of fuel consumed. 
2.1 Estimating and Apportioning Enterprise-wide Costs of Battlefield 
Consumption 
Following the terminology of the guidance in the DAG, we will use the term “assured 
delivery price (ADP)” to refer to the FBC (including transport and force-protection 
assets) per unit of fuel delivered to a given location in the supply chain. The DAG 
specifies that the ADP for liquid fuel is in units of $/gallon and is the value commonly 
referred to as FBCF. The DAG uses FBCF to refer to the ADP times the daily quantity of 
fuel required by the system, and would be measured in units of $/day. In the DAG, the 
term “apportionment” is used to describe the determination of what portion of the 
logistics tail cost to attribute to the platform or system being evaluated. 
2.2 Apportionment in Multistage Logistics Chains 
In a multistage supply chain, the transport of fuel from the source (usually a DFSP) to the 
battlefield is not accomplished in a single round-trip. Rather, the trip is broken down into 
multiple stages, because the distance is very long or because terrain, quantities required, 
or force-protection requirements differ across stages. 
Consider a very simple, hypothetical model of a three-stage logistics chain that provides 
fuel to a single battlefield, as shown in Table 1, and first presented in [15]. Fuel delivered 
is the total number of gallons of fuel that each stage delivers to the beginning of the next 
stage. The battlefield fuel demand at the end of Stage 3 is 1,000 gallons. In each stage, 
the transport and force-protection assets require fuel to operate. The fuel consumption by 
each stage is a given percentage of the amount delivered at the end of the stage. In Stage 
1, for example, logistics activities directly consume 0.15 gallons for every gallon 
delivered to the end of Stage 1. Fuel costs are calculated as the fuel consumption, in 
gallons, multiplied by the current DLA-E fuel price for diesel, $2.30/gallon.
2
 
                                                        
2
 For F-76 diesel fuel; current as of September 16, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.energy.dla.mil/ 
DLA_finance_energy/Pages/dlafp03.aspx. 
 7 
Table 1 Here 
Nonfuel operating costs are all other O&S costs, depreciation, infrastructure and 
recapitalization, and infrastructure for tactical delivery assets and associated security 
(force protection)—everything attributable to the logistics sector, and capturing the 
DAG-defined price elements #2 and #3 (excluding fuel consumed directly by logistics 
activities on this stage). Nonfuel operating costs are set to $2/gallon delivered to the next 
stage. This value is included purely to illustrate the multiplier effect, but is much lower 
than the other costs estimated in the AEPI (2008) scenario by stage (they use the term 
“leg”) [16]. The last column in Table 1 shows the total operating cost, including fuel, per 
gallon delivered to the next stage. 
A straightforward way to estimate the ADP would be to take the sum of the per-gallon 
operating costs of all three stages, plus the DLA-E commodity price. This would yield an 
estimated ADP of 7.50 + 2.30 = 9.80. 
A quick check, however, shows that this understates the costs attributable to battlefield 
fuel demand. This supply chain delivers 1,000 gallons of fuel to the battlefield, at a total 
cost of 9,346. The total operating cost per gallon delivered to the battlefield is, therefore, 
$9,346/1,000 gallons, or $9.35/gallon. The ADP is therefore 9.35 + 2.30 = 11.65. 
The difference between the correct ADP, 11.65, and the incorrect estimate of 9.80 is due 
to the multiplier effect: the phenomenon in which increases in fuel consumption will 
cascade back through the supply chain. As we will show later, this effect increases 
dramatically as the number of stages becomes large. 
Figure 1 illustrates the consumption of fuel by stage. On Stage 3, 1,000 gallons is 
transported directly to the battlefield, and Stage 3 consumes 20% of 1,000 gallons, or 200 
gallons. On Stage 2, however, 1,200 gallons must be transported—1,000 gallons for 
eventual delivery to the battlefield, plus the 200 gallons required to supply the logistics 
activities on Stage 3. Therefore, Stage 2 consumes 30% of 1,200, or 360 gallons of fuel. 
Similarly, Stage 1 must transport the battlefield’s 1,000-gallon demand, plus 200 gallons 
for Stage 3, plus 360 gallons for Stage 2. The total amount of fuel required at the 
beginning of Stage 1 just to provide the 1,000 gallons to the battlefield is 1,794 gallons, 
and the fuel multiplier for the warfighter in this example is 1,794/1,000 = 1.79. 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
2.3 Defining the Fuel Multiplier 
The fuel multiplier reflects that logistics activities themselves consume fuel. In general, if 
organic assets are used to deliver fuel, transport and force-protection platforms will not 
be able to refuel commercially or at DLA-E prices for stages that do not originate at a 
DFSP. Fuel multipliers quantify the impact of the fuel requirements of the supply chain 
itself. We use the following notation: 
 is the index of a given stage in the supply chain 
= the ratio of fuel consumed by logistics activities (e.g., transport vehicles) on Stage  





= the multiplier for Stage , , i.e., the number of gallons of fuel that must 
be provided at the beginning of Stage s for one gallon to reach the end of Stage  (the 
beginning of Stage s + 1, or the battlefield if Stage s is the final stage). 
Since > 0, and > 1, allocating the costs of resources associated with fuel supply 
logistics on early stages proportionally to the amount required on the battlefield will 
underestimate the resources incurred by battlefield demand. 
The multiplier effect is cumulative along the supply chain. One gallon of fuel that is used 
at the end of the third stage in the above example, for instance, incurs a system-wide 
requirement of 1.79 gallons of fuel: . We denote this cumulative 
multiplier as  = the amount of fuel required throughout the chain per gallon consumed 
at the end of Stage , defined as 
.       (1) 
In this example, B3  =1.79. One gallon of fuel used at the end of the second stage incurs a 
system-wide fuel requirement of  gallons, i.e. B2  =1.50.  
The concept of a multiplier has been noted by others. For example, [10] notes that, 
“Savings downstream in a long logistics chain save more fuel: delivering 1 gallon to the 
Army speartip consumes about 1.4 extra gallons in logistics.” However, the cumulative 
multiplier for each stage is simply the product of the stage-by-stage multipliers. This 
means that improving the efficiency of any stage would have the same proportional 
impact on the fuel multipliers at all downstream locations in the network. A reduction in 
battlefield fuel requirement downstream, however, has a bigger impact on the 
organization-wide fuel requirement, as multipliers are strictly increasing along the chain, 
i.e.   
Many analyses (e.g., [18]) model a single-stage supply chain, in which the multiplier 
effect is not relevant. Other calculations neglect the multiplier effect. Early versions of 
the Army’s FBC methodology specifically apportioned logistics costs on each stage (or 
leg) based on the amount consumed by the end user. As described in [17], for Leg 1, the 
total cost of convoys on this leg is calculated, and a percentage of that (10.7%) is counted 
towards the cost of fuel for the warfighting unit, a Stryker Brigade Combat Team 
(SBCT). The percentage is the two-day fuel consumption by the SBCT, divided by the 
total payload capacity of the convoys, which are assumed to go every two days. The cost 
to transport additional fuel to supply the convoys traveling on Legs 2, 3, and 4 is 
explicitly not attributed to the SBCT. 
Although the early Army FBC methodology did not capture the fuel multiplier effect, the 
Army’s current FBC Tool does capture the fuel multiplier effect without calculating it 
directly.  In the current implementation of the model
3
, the FBCF is calculated at the 
beginning of each stage, and is used in cost estimates for later stages.  This means that 
                                                        
3
 Jan Montgomery, Logistics Innovation Agency, personal communication. October 1, 2012. 
bs s bs =1+a s s
a s bs







1.50 1.15 1.30 
s > ¢s Þ Bs > B ¢s .
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although the quantity of fuel that the supply chain must transport is not directly 
calculated, the fuel multiplier effect would be accounted for in each stage’s FBCF.  
Denoting the fully burdened cost at the end of stage s  as sC , the formula should be 
  11s s sC C    plus stage s  non-fuel logistics costs per gallon delivered on stage s .  
Using the example in Table 1, 
1C  = $4.65, 2C  = $8.04, and 3C  = $11.65, thus matching 
our calculation. 
To get a more accurate estimate of the total cost, the DAG [11] explicitly calls for the 
FBC to include “costs directly and indirectly attributable to the system (i.e., costs that 
would not occur if the system did not exist), regardless of funding source or management 
control.” Therefore, the cost to transport the fuel required for downstream stages of the 
supply chain should be included in FBC estimates. 
The remainder of this article estimates the fuel multiplier for three example supply chains 
and examines the impact of the fuel multiplier on the fully burdened monetary cost of 
delivered fuel, as well as the impact of force-protection requirements on the fuel 
multiplier and on the capability available for other warfighter missions. 
3 Estimating the Multiplier Effect 
3.1 The Model 
To estimate the fuel multiplier for fuel delivered to each point in a supply chain, the fuel 
consumed by the logistics activities, per unit of fuel delivered to the end of the stage, 
must be estimated for each stage. In this paper, we estimate the fuel consumed to propel 
transport vehicles and force-protection vehicles used to escort the transport vehicles. This 
ignores fuel consumed for other purposes that support the logistics chain, such as fuel 
consumed to deploy the platforms to the theater. The estimates here, however, provide 
lower bounds on the fuel multipliers for the modeled supply chains. 
We define the following new parameters: 
= number of transport vehicles in convoy for Stage  
= number of force-protection vehicles in convoy for Stage  
= fuel consumption per unit length for each transport vehicle on Stage  
= fuel consumption per unit length for each force-protection vehicle on Stage  
 = round-trip length of Stage  (may be measured in units of time or distance, with 
consumption rates specified accordingly) 
= fuel payload per transport vehicle on Stage  (the type of transport vehicle may 
differ by stage) 
A
sg  = fuel consumption per hour by force-protection aircraft on Stage  
 = air support requirement (aircraft-hours) on Stage  (Apache AS-64A assumed) 
Thus, the amount of fuel consumed on Stage s per unit of fuel delivered to the end of 
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to Stage 1, per convoys
                                                (2) 
Time is not represented in this model. The multiplier  is a ratio of the quantity of fuel 
entering a stage to the quantity fuel leaving that stage; that quantity could be a daily, 
weekly, or annual consumption, or, as in our calculations and Equation (2), the amount 
delivered per convoy. The model presumes the convoy composition on a given stage does 
not change. However, the composition may differ across stages, and the total payload 
may differ across stages. The cumulative multiplier  may be interpreted as an average 
over many convoys on each stage, where the number of convoys required on each stage 
may differ. Below, we show results for three scenarios. 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Helmand Province Scenario 
Dubbs [18] modeled a portion of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) logistics 
network in Helmand Province in Afghanistan, from Kandahar to all downstream forward 
operating bases (FOBs) and combat outposts (COPs). Below, we show results for a  
three-stage chain from Camp Leatherneck to the Now Zad FOB to the Bar Now Zad 
COP. The other FOB in this supply chain is Deleram, and the two FOBs serve a total of 
11 COPs. 
Dubbs described typical convoy compositions for each stage based on information 
provided by Jeffrey Kausek, a former USMC Captain [18].
4
 Fuel is delivered in convoys 
consisting of fuel trucks and force-protection vehicles. Vehicle characteristics for all 
scenarios in Section 3.2 are given in Table 2. Table 3 shows the convoy compositions 
and stage distances for the Bar Now Zad supply chain, and calculates the stage-wise and 
cumulative multipliers, showing that 1.71 gallons of fuel must be delivered to Kandahar 
for each gallon that the warfighter requires at Bar Now Zad. The Kandahar to 
Leatherneck stage consumes only 4% as much fuel as it delivers, while the Leatherneck 
to Now Zad stage consumes 37% as much fuel as it delivers. In 2009, the USMC was 
able to contract for delivery of fuel at Camp Leatherneck for $6.39/gallon [13].
5
 At this 
rate, and removing the Kandahar to Camp Leatherneck stage, the ADP at Bar Now Zad 
would be at least 6.391.371.20=10.45, excluding all other costs (personnel, 
depreciation, etc.) associated with USMC logistics assets. Moreover, the $6.39/gallon 
                                                        
4
 Jeffrey Kausek separated from active service on May 30, 2011, as Battalion Logistics Officer for 3rd 
Battalion, 4th Marines, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division. Mr. Kausek served two tours in 
Afghanistan as a supply officer for the USMC. 
5
 According to MEAT (2010), in 2009, contracted fuel was delivered as far as Camp Leatherneck, which 
would mean that no fuel multiplier was incurred for organic logistics between Kandahar and Leatherneck, 
and only two stages of the logistics chain from Leatherneck to Bar Now Zad would be organic, which is a 




rate was for 2009, when market oil prices were roughly half what they were in late 2012 
and the vast majority of fuel was shipped through Pakistan. Pakistan closed the fuel 
routes for seven months, ending in July 2012, during which time the supply traveled 
either by air or along the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a supply route to 
Afghanistan from the Baltic and Black Seas through Central Asia. Contracted transport 
prices on the NDN are substantially higher–estimated at $17,000 per container, vs. 
$7,000 on routes through Pakistan [19].  
Table 2 Here 
Table 3 Here 
The difference between the fuel multipliers for Stage 1 from Kandahar to Leatherneck 
and the later stages is meaningful. The road infrastructure in the Helmand Province 
logistics network is varied. For example, some of the FOBs and COPs lie directly along 
the A1 (Kandahar-Herat) Highway. Now Zad, on the other hand, lies off the highway, 
and the terrain separating it is very difficult. Therefore, it is estimated that it takes three 
hours for a convoy to travel 60 miles from Camp Leatherneck to Deleram, but 18 hours 
for a convoy to travel 40 miles from Camp Leatherneck to Now Zad. Vehicles’ fuel 
efficiencies decline in poor terrain; therefore, Dubbs modeled fuel consumption as 
proportional to the duration of the trip. This makes the logistics network supplying Bar 
Now Zad very fuel intensive, and highlights that in remote areas and in an immature 
theater, the fuel requirements of the logistics support itself may be a serious 
consideration. 
3.2.2 Army Sustain the Mission Project Iraq Scenario 
AEPI [16] describes the methodology behind the Army’s FBC Tool, developed as part of 
the Sustain the Mission Project (SMP). The document details the calculations for a base 
case scenario—a four-stage logistics chain transporting fuel a total of 550 miles (one 
way) from Kuwait to an SBCT in Iraq, with transfers at the convoy-support FOB Cedar 
II, an Expeditionary Sustainment Center (ESC), and the Brigade Support Battalion 
(BSB). 
The convoy compositions differ by stage, and airborne force protection is included for a 
fraction of each stage. The details are provided in Table 4 together with fuel consumption 
and multiplier calculations. In the SMP scenarios, air protection is provided by two 
Apache (AH-64) helicopters over a portion of the trip on each stage (20% on Stage 1, and 
40% on the remaining stages). The helicopters’ fuel consumption is counted toward the 
stage’s total fuel consumption only during the portion in which they are used. 
Table 4 Here 
The cumulative multiplier at the end of Stage 4 (the SBCT) is  = 1.07. This means that 
based exclusively on the fuel consumed directly in transport and force protection 
platforms (vehicles and aircraft), an extra 0.07 gallons is required for every gallon 
consumed by the SBCT. The impact of this on fuel purchase costs (price element #1 in 
the DAG) is that the DLAE standard price of $3.19/gallon [16] should be multiplied by 
1.07, for a cost of $3.41/gallon used by SBCT. 
B4
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3.2.3 Army Sustain the Mission Project Immature-Theater Scenario 
AEPI [16] also describes an immature theater scenario. In an immature theater, we would 
expect a longer supply chain (greater distance between commercial sources of supply and 
the battlefield), as well as greater fuel consumption on each stage.  This is due primarily 
to the need for force protection, but also due to the likely delays and compromised fuel 
efficiency associated with poor roads and other infrastructure challenges. 
The immature-theater scenario is shorter (1,700 miles round-trip, versus 1,100 miles 
round-trip for the Iraq scenario), uses 5,000-gallon capacity transport vehicles along the 
entire supply chain instead of the larger tanker trailers used on the first two (long) legs in 
the Iraq scenario, and requires more air support. The ratio of transport vehicles to force-
protection vehicles (4:1) is the same in the two scenarios, and the convoy speed (35 miles 
per hour [mph]) is the same. The analysis uses standard fuel consumption rates per 
vehicle, and so they are not affected by the potential reduction in fuel efficiency due to 
potentially compromised infrastructure in an immature theater [16].  
Table 5 shows our analysis of this scenario, which assumes four identical stages; the 
number of stages was specified but the breakdown by distance was not [16]. As expected, 
the multipliers are larger for the immature theater. The multipliers  = 1.043 on each 
stage and cumulatively, = 1.18. For every gallon of fuel consumed by the warfighter, 
an extra 0.18 gallons must be provided at the beginning of Stage 1 to sustain the supply 
chain. 
Table 5 Here 
3.3 Discussion 
3.3.1 Impact on Fully Burdened Cost Calculations 
Fuel is not the only resource consumed in the transport of fuel. Due to the multiplier 
effect, extra fuel to sustain downstream logistics must be transported and protected in 
each stage. Therefore, other costs—such as vehicle depreciation, personnel, maintenance, 
and deployment of the logistics vehicles to the theater—associated with those platforms 
should also be charged to the FBC of battlefield fuel consumption. If we assume other 
costs, quantified for the SMP base-case scenario and allocated proportionally to the 
length of the stage, then the revised ADP, including the fuel multiplier, should be 
$15.53/gallon, rather than the $14.13/gallon calculated in [16]—a 10% difference.  
3.3.2 Sensitivity to Force-Protection Requirements 
As highlighted in the DAG FBCE discussion, the logistics footprint is especially 
important in high-threat environments. In these environments, not only will long portions 
of the supply chain be organic, without access to commercial fuel or contracted delivery 
services, but the vulnerable supply network may require force protection to ensure 
delivery.  In general, there is an inverse relationship between force protection and asset 
attrition.  In this paper, we model the additional costs in high-threat environments via 
force protection.  We assume that force protection is sufficient for the given environment; 




In order to explore the impact of the level of force protection required, we separate the 
transport function from the force-protection function on each stage, and introduce the 
concept of a sector. Following the conventions of input-output (IO) analysis, sectors 
require each other’s inputs, and meet the requirements of all other sectors. First 
conceived and most often applied to the analysis of national economies [20,21], using 
industries and subindustries as the units of analysis (sectors), IO is a simple, but 
powerful, tool. 
In recent years, IO analysis has been extended to model greater detail in the material and 
economic relationships in the economy, and to trace the resource and environmental 
impacts through economic systems. The research literature is rich with applications to 
Life Cycle Assessment (LCA), which is the estimation of the environmental impacts of 
consumption of products and services, traced back through the economy [22]. Physical 
IO analyses represent the transformation of materials through production processes to 
trace resource requirements and environmental impacts throughout a system [23]. 
In our supply-chain model, each sector provides a particular type of output on a particular 
stage. Thus, for a supply chain with four stages requiring transportation and force 
protection, there are eight sectors. The origin may also be interpreted as a sector; when 
another sector requires output from the origin, this simply means that the output must be 
provided at the start of the supply chain. As previously, the transport sector’s output in 
each stage is fuel delivered to the end of the stage. The force-protection sector’s output is 
a measure of force protection provided on that stage; we will use vehicle-hours. A 
convoy that requires two force-protection vehicles along a 100-mile stage will, therefore, 
require 200 vehicle-miles of force protection. 
Previously, each Stage  required one input (fuel) from an external source (for =1) or 
from the preceding stage. In the IO model, each sector may now require output from 
more than one other sector to be used as input. In particular, each force-protection sector 
requires fuel provided by the prior stage’s transport sector. It is assumed that force-
protection sectors do not demand further force protection.
6
 Each transport sector requires 
fuel provided by the prior stage’s transport sector, as well as force protection provided by 
the same stage’s force-protection sector. The associated notation is given below: 
i,j indices of sectors 
 = the quantity of output produced by Sector i 
 = the amount of output from Sector i required by Sector j to produce one unit of 
Sector ’s output. The ’s are called the IO coefficients. 
For convenience, we also define 
= the stage associated with Sector i 
= the transport sector for Stage  
= the force-protection sector for Stage  
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Now, the IO coefficients may be calculated. For a transport Sector j and , 
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Similarly, for force-protection Sector j, , when the units of force-
protection output are the same as the denominator of the fuel-consumption rate, , 
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For transport Sector j, and , 
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 .                                                   (5) 
All other  = 0. The amount of output required for each stage, , is either determined 
exogenously (e.g., warfighter demand is the output of the transport sector in the final 
stage), or determined as the solution to a set of mass-balance equations, given in Equation 
(6) below, for all  whose output is not exogenous: 
.                                                      (6) 
Table 6 shows an IO coefficient matrix that matches the AEPI immature-theater 
example, except that no air protection is used and, therefore, the multiplier effect is lower 
than it would be in the original scenario. In particular, it is 5,439 gallons/5,000 gallons = 
1.09. 
Table 6 Here 
Rather than viewing force protection as logistics activity, we may take the perspective 
that these platforms are in theater for their warfighting capability and may be diverted to 
protect the supply chain if necessary. In this view, the quantity of force-protection output 
produced does not change based on the size of the supply chain. Instead, the force-
protection output available to provide warfighting capabilities declines as more force 
protection is allocated to protecting the supply chain. 
Assume that the warfighter produces force-protection output (measured in hours) at the 
same resource intensity (here, 0.13 gallons per mile) as the force-protection vehicles 
operating on the supply chain. With 5,000 gallons, for example, the warfighter produces 
1,093 hours of warfighting output. In the baseline scenario, in each stage, each convoy 
consists of  4 force-protection vehicles and 16 transport vehicles—a force-
i = iT s j( )-1( )
i = iT s j( )-1( )
gs
P














protection ratio of 0.25. In the baseline scenario shown, for every 5,000 gallons 
delivered to the battlefield, the warfighter produces 1,093 hours on the battlefield, plus 
439 hours total protecting the four stages, for a total of 1,531 hours. The supply chain, 
therefore, requires 29% of the total warfighter output. Figure 2 shows the effect of the 
force-protection ratio on the percentage of force-protection output used by the supply 
chain. 
FIGURE 2 HERE  
In this model, this percentage approaches 100% asymptotically as the number of fuel-
protection vehicles per transport vehicles increases. With a small change in Equation (4) 
describing the assumption about where force-protection vehicles refuel, the percentage is 
no longer bounded by 100%. If the force-protection vehicles along the supply chain 
refuel at the destination node, they consume fuel delivered by the transport vehicles they 
are protecting. The force-protection vehicles can consume all the fuel delivered by the 
transport vehicles they protect; the single-stage multiplier goes to infinity and the supply 
chain becomes a self-licking ice cream cone. 
3.3.3 Factors Driving the Multiplier 
Three factors determine the size of the multiplier in each stage: resource intensity, length, 
and availability of supplies. 
The greater the resource intensity of the chain—the more fuel, labor, spare parts, 
ammunition, and other resources—required per unit of supply delivered by each stage, 
the larger the single-stage multiplier, and the larger the multiplier for all downstream 
points. This means that logistics and force-protection platforms that are relatively 
inefficient drive up the enterprise-wide multiplier considerably. Transport over difficult 
terrain, which leads to lower vehicle fuel efficiency, has this effect as well. 
In addition, greater force-protection requirements drive greater resource intensity in the 
supply chain. A high-threat environment, with the enemy targeting the supply chain 
in an attempt to deny access, is likely to have a very high fuel multiplier. The SMP base 
case scenario has much bigger convoys, including larger-capacity fuel vehicles and fewer 
force-protection vehicles per transport vehicle. The fuel requirement per gallon delivered 
in each stage is, therefore, lower, and the multipliers are lower than for the Bar Now Zad 
supply chain. Even in the SMP base-case scenario, however, convoys get smaller 
downstream, with a higher ratio of force-protection to transport vehicles, and smaller 
transport vehicles are used downstream (near the “point of the spear”). Fuel consumption 
in extreme forward positions is the most costly. 
The length of the organic portion of the supply chain is a driver. For n  identical stages 
with bs = b  in each stage, following Equation (2), Bn = b
n –in other words, the 
multiplier increases exponentially with the number of stages in the organic portion of the  










Moreover, the distance between sources of fuel (or other supplies) and points of 
consumption (by both the end user and logistics platforms) drives the multiplier. If the 
length of a stage exceeds the distance the vehicles can travel on their non-payload fuel 
tank, they must consume fuel they are transporting, and the payload delivered at the end 
of the stage declines. In fact, the amount of fuel consumed on a stage increases rapidly as 
the length of the stage becomes large, as described in [24]. Fuel consumption imposes an 
upper bound on the possible length of each stage, determined by the fuel capacity of the 
vehicles. Fuel consumption per gallon delivered (a s ) increases asymptotically as the 
length approaches this upper bound. 
The estimates in this paper exclude the logistics costs for delivering supplies, other than 
fuel that sustain transport and force-protection vehicle. 
4. Future Directions 
Sustainment of these vehicles and personnel requires other inputs besides fuel, such as 
food and water. Thus, since additional fuel consumed downstream requires additional 
transport and force protection earlier in the supply chain, the fuel multiplier also increases 
requirements for these other inputs. Similarly to the other factors excluded from the 
analysis in this paper, incorporating this would increase the multipliers. 
Moreover, the estimates in this paper cover only the sustainment phase of operations. A 
more complete analysis would include asset depreciation, and the resources required for 
deployment, which may be quite substantial.  Inclusion of these factors would increase 
the multipliers. 
A natural question is: how much cost is not captured if the fuel (or other) multiplier effect 
is ignored? If it is on the order of 10%, for example, then it is a much smaller impact than 
the uncertainty regarding the future price of fuel, and so perhaps insignificant from a 
decision-making perspective. We would argue, however, that because it causes a 
systematic underestimate (rather than just imprecision) in FBCF estimates, it is a cause 
for concern. That is, whether multiplier effects account for an error in an FBCF estimate 
of 10% or 100%, that error will always be an underestimate of overall costs. 
In addition, for reasons described above, the estimates here should be considered lower 
bounds on the impact of the multiplier effect, as they exclude resource consumption in 
deployment, consumption of non-fuel supplies by logistics activities, and attrition of the 
assets themselves. We recommend more detailed studies to estimate the magnitude of the 
logistics multiplier effect to determine how important it is to incorporate it into FBC 
estimation methods. 
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Figure 1: Illustration of fuel consumption in three-stage supply chain from Table 1. 
 
 
Figure 2: The impact of the force-protection ratio on the percentage of warfighter 


































































Force-protection ratio  
Table 1: Hypothetical three-stage supply chain. 











(gallons) Non-Fuel Fuel Total 
1 1,560 15 $3,120  $538  $3,658  $2.35  
2 1,200 30 $2,400  $828  $3,228  $2.69  
3 1,000 20 $2,000  $460  $2,460  $2.46  
  Total      $7,520  $1,826  $9,346  
  
Table 2: Vehicle characteristics used in the scenarios. The hourly consumption rates used in the Helmand Province scenario 
are based on poor terrain and low speeds and are from Dubbs (19). Consumption rates for the platforms used in the Sustain 
the Mission Project scenarios are from the current version of the Army’s Fully Burdened Cost Tool and derive from AMSAA. 
 







Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR)  
 
13.3 1,800 
8000-gallon tanker trailer, towed by M967 tractor 0.22
 
8,000 
5000-gallon tanker trailer, towed by M967 tractor 0.22 
 
5,000 
TRUCK TANK FS 2500G M978A 0.19 
 
2,500 
Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle (MRAP) 
 
10.2
 MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (MATV) 
 
6.9 
 Apache (AH-64D) 175.0 
M1117 Armored Security Vehicle 0.13 
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Table 3: Analysis of the Bar Now Zad supply chain in Helmand Province. 
 




















  (hours) (gallons) (gallons)   
1 (Kandahar to Leatherneck) 5 MTVR MRAP 43 11 0 3,423  77,400 1.04  1.71  
2 (Leatherneck to Now Zad) 36 MTVR MRAP 8 4 0 5,305  14,400 1.37  1.64  
3 (Now Zad to Bar Now Zad) 8 MTVR MRAP 1 3 0 352  1,800 1.20  1.20  
 
Table 4: Analysis of the Army Sustain the Mission Project base-case scenario, a supply chain in Iraq. 
 




















  (hours) (gallons) (gallons)   
1 (Kuwait to Cedar II) 450 8000 M1117 16 4 5.1  2,700  128,000  1.02 1.07 
2 (Cedar 2 to ESC) 500 8000 M1117 16 4 11.4  4,000  128,000  1.03 1.05 
3 (ESC to BSB) 100 5000 M1117 16 4 2.3  800  80,000  1.01 1.02 










Table 5: Analysis of the Army Sustain the Mission Project immature-theater scenario, a 1,700-mile round-trip organic supply 
chain. 
 















Quantity Air Support 
Stage Transport 
Force 
Protection   
(hours) (gallons) (gallons)   
1 425 5000 M1117 16 4 9.7  3,400  80,000  1.04 1.18 
2 425 5000 M1117 16 4 9.7  3,400  80,000  1.04 1.13 
3 425 5000 M1117 16 4 9.7  3,400  80,000  1.04 1.09 
4 425 5000 M1117 16 4 9.7  3,400  80,000  1.04 1.04 
 
Table 6: An input-output matrix for a supply chain with transport (T) and force-protection (FP) components. The fuel 
consumption rates match the Sustain the Mission Project immature-theater scenario, with no air support. 
   
Component (Stage and Type) 
Component 
 
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 
(Stage and Type) Origin T FP T FP T FP T FP 
Origin 0 1.018 0.131 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 T 0 0 0 1.018 0.131 0 0 0 0 
1 FP 0 0.021 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    
2 T 0 0 0 0 0 1.018 0.131 0 0    
2 FP 0 0 0 0.021 0 0 0 0 0    
3 T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.018 0.131  
3 FP 0 0 0 0 0 0.021 0 0 0    
4 T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    
4 FP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.021 0    
Output  5,439   5,326   113   5,215   111   5,106   109   5,000   105 
 
(units) (gallons)  (gallons)  (hours) (gallons)  (hours)  (gallons)  (hours)   (gallons)  (hours)  
ns
T ns
P bs Bs
